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The prints in this issue of The Cresset are part of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's project Art for
Faith's Sake, funded in part by Lutheran Brotherhood.
They appear with the kind permission of Wendell G.
Mathews of the DeKoven Center, 600 21st Street, Racine,
WI 53403, from whom prints are available. Diederich
Kortlang taught at Carthage College before his death in
1974.
Above: Diederich Kortlang, German, 1925-1974. Good
Samaritan. Woodblock, 18x25 inches.
Cover: Kortlang. The Angels and the Dragon. Woodblock,
18x25 inches.
Back cover: Kortlang. Good Samaritan, Detail.
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IN LUCETUA
Comment by the Editor
Doing the opposite of what sensible people
who live in terrible climates should do, I have been
travelling about in the last week. In an ice storm of
some dimensions, I flew to Minneapolis to observe the
Nobel Peace Prize Forum, an event sponsored by the
five Lutheran colleges of Norwegian foundation, and
hosted this year in the rotation by Augsburg College. It
was the sort of thing for which the term "heady experience" was originally made. The planners had put
together a list of speakers whose combined experience
and understanding weighed enough to have sunk a battleship, as we used to say. But sinking battleships can
hardly be the appropriate image for a conference
designed to inform and inspire the young with the possibilities for new thinking about the issues of world
peace, justice and human rights. Instead then, let us
say that the speakers combined enough wisdom and
idealism and courage to move mountains perhaps, or
even to change the way we think about doing good.
The headliners were Jimmy Carter and Yelena
Bonner, who carne to fulfill her late husband's commitment to attend. (In his honor, this year's event was
dedicated to Dr. Andrei Sakharov.) Also speaking were
Peter DuffY, the chair of Amnesty International, correspondent Flora Lewis, diplomat Max Karnpelrnan, Geir
Lundestad of the Nobel Peace Prize Institute, and
Walter Mondale, as well as David Preuss, bishop emeritus of the American Lutheran Church. On Friday these
people met with groups of students from the five colleges (Augsburg, St. Olaf, Luther, ConcordiaMoorhead and Augustana-Sioux Falls) in small working
sessions on topics concerning human rights issues. On
Saturday, the Augsburg gymnasium was packed from 9
till 5:30 with several thousand people to listen to the
speeches and responses to questions. It was a remarkable event, and we will write a greater length about
some of its implications in a later issue. (Some of our
sense of awe will by then have faded; at the moment,
we may still be dazed by having been in a situation
where the answer to our question, "which way to the
press briefing?" drew the answer, "just follow Mr.
Mondale." Which we did, but that's another story.)
At present, thinking through the hundreds of
details from the two days, and the many wise and
insightful and unexpected things said by the speakers,
we are strongly conscious of the need for profound
changes in the way we think and speak. "Sinking a batMarch, 1990

tleship" is one example. Or that I had first written, in
the sentence before last, that a thought had "struck"
me. Why do thoughts strike, instead of stroking, or
caressing, or lighting, or settling down in the mind?
We seem to be constructed so that language of conquest and aggression forms the way we speak about our
experience. Is it also the way then that we concerive of
our experience? And is it then the inevitable way we
must always live with each other?
My other trip in the last week was to the
Lutheran Center, or Higgins Road as it is frequently
called. I had been reading about Higgins Road lately,
and most of what I read is pretty combative. Because I
did not grow up in the churches whose affairs are
being administered from there, I am not a part of its
history, and I do not know about the struggles from the
inside. I just saw a building full of people who looked
to me as if they were working hard, and in not very
pleasant conditions, to do their work. I should have
said, judging from the signs, that it was the work of the
church that they were about.
But a difficulty of course, is that we have trouble
agreeing about what that work should be. I was at
Higgins Road to choose artwork for the covers of this
month's Cresset, which I did. I like the Kortlang woodcuts for their use of line, the way he has taken a hard,
intractable material and made an image which is fluid.
What seemed stiff has, with his skill, taken on life and
motion. As I look at the two images, they seem to me to
describe two ways of dealing with evil. The angels see
the dragon, and with their strong arms and thtir
weapons they are about the business of destroying it.
They are unhestitaing and confident and determined.
They know what they are about. The Samaritan does
not see the dragons, or the robbers, but only the
wounded man. In Kortlang's vision he isn't even doing
anything, just holding the other in a position reminiscent of a pieta. The world, seen from the vantage of
people like Carter and Bonner, is about as filled with
wounded, and maybe as filled with dragons, as we can
imagine. Can the churches get any better at responding to the need? Are we as church in the
dragon-bashing business? And how must that be done?
Or should our energies and even our theology focus on
holding and comforting and healing the wounded
world?O
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About This Issue
Last fall, our new colleague and old friend Jim
Bachman asked whether the members of VU's philosophy department could think together about some
issues of doing philosophy in a community like, for
example, a Christian university. And, as you will see,
they did. In addition to having thought, they went so
far as to write some of those thoughts, the results of
which are published in this issue. Each of the four
members of the department submitted an article, each
of them on time, and only about one third longer than
asked for, which anyone who has ever dealt with
philosohers can tell you is a record.
When we sorted out pages and column inches, we
discovered that if all four were to be published at once,
there would be no room for anyone else, and thus we
prevailed on Professor Klein to delay his piece until
April. Since he has written powerfully on how we
might think about nuclear weapons, his article fits very
well into next month's issue and its theme of new
thinking and new living. But it should be clear that he
is a philosopher, and he is with his colleagues in this
joint endeavor.
This effort has been a good thing for the Cresset,
strengthening its sometimes apparently tenuous connections to its roots in Christian higher education, or
in high religion and high thinking. These roots are

never very far from the editor's mind, though the fruit
may at times appear unexpected.
Kevin Geiman's
article, for instance, asks about the "we" of the community Macintyre requires, and Renu Juneja's comments
about a current American obsession with autobiography loops back to those problems from another
direction. Is there an American "we"? And if so, who
describes it best? Edward Byrne's column on film
makes such a nomination, which will not be surprising,
but allows him to enter this year's Oscar sweepstakes.
Byrne's claims for film and film directors as truth
tellers join other such claims, and thus can hardly be
ignored or dismissed as secondary by those concerned
with high religion. If one is going to teach faithfully
within a culture, how are judgments to be brought to
bear on it unless it has been examined? And though we
may expect that philosophers will natur-ally reflect on
faith as it relates to culture, Tom Kennedy's review of
the thinking of several contemporary Catholic philosophers describes just what a radical undertaking such
examinations may be. And Bachman? He is pastor, theologian, philosopher, teacher -and he keeps all those
balls are in the air here.
Peace,
GME

Shades
Tears of smoke run down
waxen faces peering
between cold wire fences.
Fires from buildings provide
an eerie backlighting
that forces shadows into
the eyes and mouths of children.
Old men, lined with ruined
faith, raise voices toward song,
a song, dark backbeat supplied
by gunshot, that moves into dance.
An obscene line dance
moving from shower to barrack
to pit without hope. Most fall
quickly, but some dance
for years-friends thinning
as bodies do, into ashuntil God takes their hands
and dances with them.

David C. Donahoe
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PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND THE PREACHING OF CHRIST
James V. Bachman

Even before my student days at Valpo I was
struggling with questions about "good reasons" and
the Christian faith. That is, I needed both philosophy
and theology. I still need both, and I still find both
equally capable of diverting me from the biblical path
of faith.
Philosophy and theology employ God's gifts of
the powers of our minds and hearts to help us probe
many different issues--the foundations of science and
mathematics, the thought worlds of various religions,
the nature of moral discourse, and so on. In this essay
I shall be focusing on only one specific topic in which
both philosophy and theology are interested: What is
the nature of the faith that may put us in a right relationship
with God?
This is a particularly treacherous question for
both philosophy and theology. If they harness the
powers of our minds and hearts to the wrong project,
both reason and faith are perverted and our relationship with God is undermined. Philosophy and
theology may, however, help illuminate what it is for
faith to crucify free choice on the God question. In
this case philosophy and theology can help us to learn
the necessity of the cross and to hear the preaching of
Christ. I hope to illustrate in a small way how philosophy and theology pursue this task.
The Faith that justifies is not a PsychologicalWork
Terence Penelhum is a contemporary philosopher who has devoted much attention to what he
thinks are the philosophical mistakes involved in certain widely popular ways of defending religious belief.
In the course of untangling some complicated debates
between believers and unbelievers he makes a particularly helpful observation. He says that "the popular
view of faith among those who do not have it is that
faith is the obstinate insistence on believing doctrines
which do not have adequate grounds-pig-headedly

James V. Bachman, an alumnus ofVU and Lutheran parish
pastor for many years, has joined the VU faculty as the John
Eckrich Professor of Religion and the Healing Arts. His writing has often appeared in The Cresset, and we hope will
continue to do so.
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being certain of doctrines that are uncertain. (1983b,
17lf.) In another place he says believers seem, to the
outsider, "to be obstinately believing the incredible."
(1983a, 301) What is helpful here is the word "obstinate."
Luther too looked at the claim "I believe" with a
suspicion that some obstinacy is involved. For, from
the biblical perspective, the phrase "I believe" often
betrays the stubborn and willful intention to make
something of myself by the way in which I define and
lay hold of God. Luther puts it this way: "Faith is not
the human notion and dream that some people call
faith." People often make the mistake that
when they hear the gospel, they get busy and by their own
powers create an idea in their heart which says, 'I believe';
they take this then to be a true faith. But, as it is a human figment and idea that never reaches the depths of the heart,
nothing comes of it either, and no improvement follows.
Faith, however, is a divine work in us which changes us and
makes us to be born anew of God, John 1. It kills the old
Adam and makes us altogether different people, in heart and
spirit and mind and powers; and it brings with it the Holy
Spirit. (LW35, 370)

Luther speaks with his usual direct clarity here,
but that will not prevent most of us from willfully reading right past the crucial phrase: "it kills the old Adam."
For Luther this is no figure of speech, but a radical
reality. It means that whatever God's gift of faith is, it is
not to be identified with the old Adam's psychological
struggle for confidence about God and his will.
Dead people can't say "I believe," and faith kills
the old Adam. Thus, Werner Elert claims that "in
Luther .... as an act of man [faith] is altogether empty." (1962, 104) Again, 'justification is no psychic
change; it is a word of God spoken to the sinner."
(1962, 87) The faith that receives justification is not a
psychological work on the part of human self will.
Faith "is no autogenous changing of one's thinking. It
depends on the hearing of the Gospel." (1962, 64f.)
Gerhard Forde puts it this way: "It is simply not possible to work with an anthropology which assumes a
continuity that survives the cross, and turns it into an
object for free choice to dally with." (1987, 11)
5

"God, where are you?"
When the question is about God, both philosophers
and theologians are hard pressed to escape a common
temptation. We want our freedom of choice to survive
intact, even at the price of not finding God. Tangled
in this perennial temptation, our old Adam wants to
choose God on its own terms; we resonate to the
snake's promise: "you will be like God." (Genesis 3:5)
We insist on our freedom to ask the question, "God,
where are you?" And we demand the freedom to judge
proposed answers. We will unmask the hidden God on
our own terms or be damned trying. The famous
philosopher and unbeliever, Bertrand Russell, is supposed to have said that, if there happens after all to be
a God, he will reproach him for providing "insufficient
evidence." (Morris, 1989)
Christ, the new Adam, however, comes with his
cross to kill us. He asks God's question, "Adam, where
are you?" (Gen. 3:9) The scriptures call this grace!
"For you know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that
though he was rich, yet for your sake he became poor,
so that by his poverty you might become rich." (2 Cor.
8:9) This rich/poor talk sounds good until we realize
just how poor Christ takes us to be. We're so poor,
we're going to have to die with him on the way to
becoming rich. But we don't want salvation on those
terms, so we go back to the snake's advice: "You don't
have to die. (cf. Gen. 3:4) Your destiny is to be like
the deathless God, not like this dying God. Let me give
you a few good ideas and feelings about God, and you
can get on with trying to find him .... "
Why should we have to take up our cross and die
with Christ? God will not and cannot be judged by
human free choice; this is the meaning of the First
Commandment: You shall have no other gods. So
God addresses human beings in the cross to crucify the
old Adam, destroying along with my old Adam the freechoice hypothesis. As Forde puts it
The positing of free choice means that the subject stands
over against the gospel as an object, a theory which is to be
accepted on grounds dictated by the subject. But what could
such grounds be? Can the subject will its own death? Willynilly, the subject, claiming to be free, constructs a defense
mechanism against the gospel, and permanent scepticism is
the outcome. (Forde, 1987,12)

In self-defense we turn from Christ to preserve
our right to choose. But then the burden of proof
about God falls upon our own mind and heart. Forde
says permanent scepticism is the outcome. But he also
observes that a well-chosen submission to some authority-whether Rome or 'inner light' or inerrant
scripture-tempts many of us as the way out of scepti6

cism. "Freedom is given with one hand only to be taken back by the other!" Forde then comments that the
Enlightenment appears from this perspective to be
"simply a kind of institutionalization of scepticism over
against ecclesiastical authoritarianism." (1987, 12)
In order not to have to crucify my own foundations in myself and my own right to choose God, I must
cut myself off from God's address to me: "Adam where
are you?" But now I constantly struggle with the correlative question, "God, where are you?" And the life I
sought to save for myself diminishes away toward
death-either in skepticism or in a troubled accommodation with some "freely chosen" authority.
God is hard to find all right! He's hard to find
because I want to find him (or be found by him) on my
own terms. So, I look for him high up in the heavens
or possibly low down in the depths, in ideas and symbols, in the motions of my own mind and heart, but
not in the all-too-human and concrete preaching of
Christ. I don't want to die, so I don't look very deeply
into the cross. Meanwhile, God is always near at hand
in Christ and his cross. St. Paul puts it this way:
The righteousness based on faith says, Do not say in your
heart, "Who will ascend into heaven?" (that is, to bring
Christ down) or 'Who will descend into the abyss?" (that is,
to bring Christ up from from the dead). But what does it
say? The word is near you, on your lips and in your heart
(that is, the word of faith which we preach); because, if you
confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your
heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.
(Romans 10:6-9)

The biblical proclamation is that God himself is
encountered in the lowliness of the preaching of Christ
and that necessarily God must there be encountered.
To seek God apart from Christ and his cross, is to cling
to free choice. But then we encounter the unrelenting
reality of God's will to destroy the old Adam, and in the
face of that we can hardly be expected to muster up
some convincing thoughts about God's kindliness, as
though he never meant the cross. We preserve ourselves-for a time, and perhaps even believe. But (as
Jesus said) we end up losing ourselves nonetheless.
The preaching of Christ is no mere means to a
higher encounter on some level of a freely-chosen relation with God. The Word claims to be present audibly
and visibly in the lowliness of the words, the water, the
bread, the wine. Thus, our problem is not really about
how to find God. He is present in Word and Sacrament. We are called to put ourselves before these
realities where He himself is present. Adam, where are
you1 "Faith comes from what is heard and what is
heard comes by the preaching of Christ." (Romans
10:17)
The Cresset

It is necessarily the preaching of Christ, because
only in Christ is the Word of the necessary death of
will-full humanity and the Word of God's forgiveness of
that same humanity encountered together in one welldefined presence and place. "Christ redeemed us from
the curse of the law, having · become a curse for us."
(Gal. 3:13)
Whenever we succumb to the temptation to take
the preaching of Christ and the cross to be imagery,
symbol, or disguise for some 'higher' reality, precisely
then we become the philosophers and theologians
against which the biblical words warn. We seek to save
our free-choice selves. Our reason gets called all the
names that Luther so notoriously called it. And our
emotions, for that matter, are not any better. Even our
faith and belief is but a "human notion and dream."
(Luther, UV, 35, 370)

Psychological Change Comes after the Faith which Justifies
Faith is not a psychological state but a constant
encounter with wrath against human presumption and
grace freely given in the preaching of Christ and his
cross. God's grace is that the preaching of Christ works
to catch us in even our most subtle (religious) acts of
self-assertion and rebellion. The preaching of Christ
catches us there and crucifies us, and only after grace
has done its saving deed do questions about our subjective state, our belief and unbelief come into the picture.
The central question we have been discussing up
to this point concerns God's finding us in the preaching of Christ. This is not a question about human
psychology. Once we are found in Christ, however,
many interesting questions about the fruits of faith
deserve attention. These include questions about the
human psychology of belief and unbelief. The simultaneously justified and sinning saint prays for help
against her or his unbelief. This is the meaning of the
anguished father's prayer, "I believe; help my unbeliefl" (Mark 9:24) When doubts arise, one must, like
that father, resolutely look away from the problem of
psychological fruitfulness back to the preaching of
Christ in which any good tree must be rooted.
Christ's faith and faithfulness become ours as a
gift, and this is the death of all our self-regarding religious seeking. But, and this is the good news, since the
faith that receives justification is not our psychological
act, therefore the certainty of faith is not a function of
our changing psychological states. Everything depends
on the hearing of the Gospel. Faith "does not seek the
answer; it hears it." (Elert, 1962, 63) In losing our
selves for Christ's sake in the radical dying to self, there
is also lifted from us the deathly burden of seeking certainty in a parade of ideas or emotions about God.
March, 1990

When Luther exclaimed to Erasmus, "What is
more wretched than uncertainty?" he was not focusing
on "the psychological possibility of doubt in the believer-which Luther knew as long as he lived-but [on]
the nature of faith itself. If faith does not have one's
own psyche as its basis and content but has Christ, it
also has in Him the basis of its certainty." (Elert, 1962,
87) What makes such a mess of discussions of faith and
reason is that we hardly ever stop to see that justifYing
faith is a work of Christ, not a work of our own minds
and hearts.
The philosopher and historian of skepticism,
Richard Popkin, could not be more wrong when he
says, as an interpretation of Luther: "Christianity
involves the affirmation of certain truths because one's
conscience is completely convinced of their veracity."
(1979, 7) Or again, "the rule of faith of the Reformers
thus appears to have been subjective certainty, the compulsions of one's conscience." (1979, 8) This
philosopher can't imagine that faith could be anything
other than the self finding grounds to convince itself.
He then goes on to criticize his travesty of Luther's
position with the easy observation that "this type of subjectivism is open to many objections." (1979, 8) Of
course it is! And the preaching of Christ cuts out this
type of subjectivism in the most radical way. The careful, self-willed philosopher seems unable even to
imagine, much less entertain, this possibility. George
Will, the contemporary Newsweek commentator, fares
no better in his misreading of Luther: "The primary
idea of the Reformation was the primacy of individual
conscience." (November 20, 1989, 90)
Luther intends his comments on the Third Article of the Creed to be taken in a radical way that cuts
out free-choice subjectivism. What is it to believe in the
Holy Spirit, the holy catholic church, the communion
of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the
body, and the life everlasting?
I believe that I cannot by my own reason or strength believe
in Jesus Christ, my Lord, or come to Him. But the Holy Spirit
has called me through the Gospel, enlightened me with His
gifts, and sanctified and kept me in true faith. In the same
way He calls, gathers, enlightens, and sanctifies the whole
Christian church on earth, and keeps it united with Jesus
Christ in the one true faith. (Small Catechism)

It is possible, of course, for us to misread this in a
way that enables us to keep a continuity between our
old self-seeking self and the new self in Christ We can
keep focusing on our own minds and hearts. I can
search whether the Holy Spirit has done his work in me
yet "God, where are you?" But then we overlook how
Luther's focus is not on our psychology but on the Spirit's work in the preaching of Christ. This work is
7

centered in the life of the "whole Christian Church on
earth ... united with Jesus Christ in the one true
faith." It is not only the church evangelism committee
that asks, Adam, where are you 7
It may help to clarity these reflections on faith by
putting them in the light of Luther's ongoing struggles
with false steps in the doctrine of justification. Thomas
Aquinas got it wrong; so did the enthusiasts. So, for
that matter, do we Lutherans. The free-choice temptation undermines us all.
Problems with Thomas Aquinas
We Lutherans try to remain at least vaguely
aware that there are some moves in Thomas' philosophical theology that might get in the way of biblical
proclamation. Lutherans approach this problem in
terms of how properly to capture the biblical relation
between grace and works. We do not always see, however, that puzzles about faith and reason are often an
instance of this problem about grace and works.
Notice how grace, works, faith, and reason are closely
entangled in a famous formulation from Thomas:
"Since therefore grace does not destroy nature, but
perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith, in
the same way as the natural inclination of the will ministers to love." (Summa Theologica, I, Question I, Eighth
Article)
Some Lutherans suspect that talk of how "the
natural inclination of the will ministers to love" may
get us into trouble with works righteousness. Others
point out, however, that Thomas talks about "grace
alone," and they suggest that if we rightly understand
him, he is no longer subject to the Lutheran critique.
Leif Crane, in his commentary on the Lutheran Au~
burg Confession of 1530, argues that it is not enough
simply to say 'grace alone.' The central question is
about how the relationship to God itself is understood. The
accusation of "works righteousness" which Luther directed
against the theology of his time thus attacks not only the view
which holds that humans have the capability to do good
works by their own power, butjust as much strikes at
Thomism, even though Thomas never forgets for a moment
that human merits are God's gifts. For, even though everything is set under grace, it is an absolutely essential premise
for Thomism that a person must become worthy of eternal
life in himself. (1987, 86f.)
Thomas presupposes a continuity in meritorious free
choice between the old Adam and the new. He takes
the action out of Christ's hands and puts it back into
self-asserting human hands.
Works have retained their place in justification-by grace
alone. But now the very thing that the emphasis on 'faith
8

alone' is intended to prevent in the Lutheran doctrine of justification has happened: righteousness is no longer equated
with Christ's righteousness. (1987, 87)
Crane sums up the underlying conceptions:
For Thomas, grace is a power by which human capability is
strengthened so that a person can raise himself up to God.
For Luther, grace is the fact that God in his mercy is present
as the one who fights for sinners who have nothing to hold
on to but the alien righteousness of Christ. (1987, 86)

The critique of Thomas thus far has been cast in
terms of grace and works, but the same dynamic is at
work in Thomistic teaching about faith and belief.
Interestingly, even Penelhum, working from the perspective of philosophical analysis, suspects that
something is wrong with Thomas' account Here is his
summary of Thomas on faith:
Each of the theological virtues comes about in a person
through the grace of God. In the case of faith, the central
act which manifests its presence is the inner act of assent to
the truths that the Church proclaims about God. He considers this assent to be a voluntary action ... but one which I am
enabled to perform only with divine help. Only such divine
help can give me the necessary willingness and desire to perform it; and, more important for our purposes, since I am
assenting to truths which reason cannot demonstrate, yet am
doing so with a certainty and assurance that otherwise only
belongs when I assent to demonstrations, grace must assist
me in the act of accepting them. Faith must be belief in
unproven truths, since there is no freedom in assenting to
what is proved, and therefore no merit in such an assent."
(1983b, 172)
The last sentence says it all. The old Adam wants
to be free to assent and so to achieve merit. Thomas
gives the old Adam a theology that puts off the cross.
To be sure, divine help enables me to make the meritorious assent, but it is nevertheless my assent. Thus, I do
not have to die with Christ in baptism in any but a nicely symbolic sense. Grace does not kill and make alive,
it only gives our self-assertion back to us-"new and
improved."
Penelhum attempts to go beyond Thomas'
account by defining faith as an attitude of trust that is
based, of necessity, on a core of cognitive beliefs. His
analysis is both insightful and wrong. It is insightful,
because he seems to recognize that trust in God is in
some sense not faith but a fruit of faith. On the other
hand, the .most important error of considering faith to
be "an achievement" of the psychological self is still
forthrightly made. (1983b, 174) Whether the achievement of trusting God is made with or without divine
The Cresset

assistance, Penelhum's trusting Christian will no more
have to die and be reborn than will Thomas' believing
Christian.
Problems with the Enthusiasts
Luther's explanation of the Third Article of the
Creed confesses that justifying faith must be kept closely tied with the preaching of Christ in the community
of the Church. Many heirs of the reformation betrayed
their misunderstanding of justification by severely
weakening this tie. In 1525 Luther criticized the
enthusiasts for "their talk of communing with the Spirit
apart from proclamation and the sacraments." The
enthusiasts claim that access to God is not through the
down-to-earth proclamation of Christ, but through
inner experience. The focus is again squarely on the
human mind and heart. The enthusiasts teach that
God's Spirit is given "after a preparation consisting of
the mortification of the flesh." So again, human willful activity, not Christ, is the key to justification.
"According to the Lutheran reformers' understanding,
the enthusiasts' perception of the Spirit contained a
dangerous subjectivistic element which would not only
dissolve the church, but which implied a denial of the
incarnation." (Crane, 1987, 72)
Dissolving the church and denying the incarnation are closely related phenomena. The church is the
community of those who gather around the lowly
preaching of Christ. Crane argues that both the
enthusiasts and Rome sought "to avoid the offense of
the incarnation." The enthusiasts emphasized the Spirit's sovereignty. The believer needs no real encounter
with the preaching of Christ, "since God in his eternal
wisdom gives the Spirit directly through some sort of
inner transformation." Rome, on the other hand,
emphasized the Spirit's bondage to the means of grace,
but this makes the sacraments sufficient in and of
themselves as tools to be manipulated by human self
will. So the truth and efficacy of sacramental practice
must be vouched for by a priesthood that can lift the
community up toward God. "Precisely for that reason,
however, it becomes necessary for the Roman church
to stress the human role in justification by describing
the psychological process which the justified person
goes through." (1987, 77) Again, the believer needs
no full encounter with the incarnate Christ, because
the coming of grace involves primarily a psychological
process of ideas and emotions rather than the slaying
of the old Adam.
Problems with the Lutherans
I've been drawing examples from Rome and the
enthusiasts, but Lutheran theologian Gerhard Forde
says Lutherans regularly sell out the incarnation as
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well. Lutherans, no more than anyone else, are ready
for the cross and the death of the old Adam. Consequently, Lutherans also become uncertain about faith's
basis in the preaching of Christ. In practice Lutherans
have resorted
mostly to a dogmatic absolutism largely dependent on
a view of scriptural inerrancy, which usually brought with it
disguised moral absolutisms of various sorts as well. A will
which supposedly begins in a state of freedom ends in captivity. The message becomes a perverted mirror image of itself:
'Yes, you are free, but you jolly well had better choose to
believe in justification by faith alone or you will go to hell.
The Bible says so! And then you had better show your thanks
by your sanctification.' (Forde, 1987,12)
Philosophy, Theology and the Preaching of Christ
Because both philosophy and theology can be so
quickly enlisted on behalf of the project of shielding
and saving the old Adam, they are dangerous guides
for the life of faith. If, however, in the presence of the
preaching of Christ, philosophy and theology can learn
the necessity of the cross, they can, as Forde puts it,
realize their limits and "give way to the sheer proclamation of grace." (1987, 15) Rightly used, careful
reflection "drives to proclamation. Its thinking is dedicated to making that proclamation hearable in a given
con text as a radical gospel which sets free from
bondage and makes all things new." (1987, 15) On
this campus, under the sign of the cross, philosophers
and theologians are struggling about and with that
task. The argument of this essay is that the first necessity is to keep placing ourselves under the biblical
preaching of Christ.
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AFTER WHOREDOM: Christian Philosophers and
Christian Universities Today
Thomas D. Kennedy

It happened again in class just last week. A student commented playfully that he had already learned
at least one thing in my philosophy class. He had
thought that all philosophers are atheists, but having
heard my homily in chapel and having seen me in
chapel several times since then, he was now convinced
that that judgment was mistaken, that not all philosophers are atheists. I, of course, reminded him that he
doesn't know me very well, pointed out some assumptions he was now making, and cautioned him that his
limited evidence might not support the new generalization he wished to make.
But his new generalization is correct and he
was initially wrong in thinking that all philosophers are
atheists. Still, his first assumption is not too surprising.
Perhaps he was raised on Luther, and the "whorish
nature of reason" has been deeply embedded in his
consciousness. Philosophers, in our refusal to "kill reason" as our evening sacrifice to God could not but be
atheists, he might think. (Dillen berger, 131) Or perhaps this student just has a good sense of how theism
in general and Christianity in particular have fared in
the last two hundred years of philosophy and philosophy education.
Philosopher Steven Cahn quotes the central
character in Tom Stoppard's play Jumpers as he reflects
upon an atheist: "Well, the tide is running his way, and
it is a tide which has turned only once in human history. . . . There is presumably a calendar date-a
moment-when the onus of proof passed from the atheist to the believer, when, quite suddenly, secretly, the
noes had it." Cahn identifies that moment as the
posthumous publication of David Hume's Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion in 1779. (Cahn, 63) I'm
not sure Cahn is correct in identifying the moment,
but certainly the "noes" have had it most visibly and
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vocally in the professional philosophical world, especially in this century. (I know of no studies which
indicate that philosophers are any more prone to atheism than, say, sociologists or historians, but the popular
image would have it that it is the philosophers who are
atheists.) The "noes" have had it and have often
flaunted having it, as many an introductory philosophy
student throughout the nation will tell.
But times change in philosophy, as elsewhere,
and although it would be absurd to say that in the
academy today the onus of proof has shifted back to
the atheist, it is the case that theistic philosophers are
much more visible and much more open about their
faith identity than they have been at any time during
this century. This new visibility of Christian philosophers can be accounted for in a number of ways, one
of them being the not entirely salutary pluralistic character of philosophy today. With the failure of any one
method or school of philosophy to establish itself as
the dominant force, a plethora of philosophical
groups have entered the circle of philosophical
respectability. So, for example, at a recent American
Philosophical Association meeting there were group
meetings of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and
Love, the Society of Iberian and Latin American
Thought, the Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals, the Association for the Philosophy of the
Unconscious, and the International Philosophers for
the Prevention of Nuclear Omnicide, along with the
Society of Christian Philosophers. Christian philosophers take a place as one among the many and
although we may not be a dominant force in professional philosophy we are a lively and growing number
in the profession. (For an engaging discussion of the
pluralistic character of contemporary philosophy see
Bernstein, 15-17)
Two events stand out in my mind as landmarks
in the newfound confidence and visibility of Christian
philosophers in this latter part of the century. The first
event occurred in April1978 when the Society of Christian Philosophers was formed at the Western Division
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in
The Cresset

Cincinnati, Ohio. The Society was founded by a number of philosophers who are Christians for the purpose
of providing Christian fellowship and encouraging
philosophical reflection on issues which are and
should be of special concern to the Christian community. The Society of Christian Philosophers, as these
founders envisioned it, would be broadly ecumenical
and would represent no particular philosophical orientation. Membership would be open to anyone who
considers himself/herself both a philosopher and a
Christian.
At that meeting William P. Alston of Syracuse
University was elected the Society's first president.
Alston is well-respected within the discipline, having
published significant works in philosophy of language
and philosophical psychology and, more recently, in
the theory of knowledge and philosophical theology.
Alston has also served as the editor of the Society's fine
journal, Faith and Philosophy, since its initial publication
in 1984. He has been succeeded as president by
Robert Adams of UCLA and Alvin Plantinga of Notre
Dame, both, like Alston, well-respected philosophers.
The Society of Christian Philosophers has
since grown to over 900 members. It sponsors meetings in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the
American Philosophical Association as well as independent regional meetings and workshops open to both
members and non-members. Many philosophers may
be dubious about or even hostile towards the Society,
but few are unfamiliar with it.
A second landmark event in the increasing visibility of Christian philosophers was Alvin Plantinga's
speech at his inauguration as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University ofNotre Dame in
1983, and the development of the Center for Philosophy of Religion at Notre Dame following Plantinga's
appointment. (I will return to Plantinga's speech in a
moment.) The Center for Philosophy of Religion at
the University of Notre Dame, co-directed by Plantinga, sponsors conferences dealing with topics of
philosophy of religion and philosophical theology and
provides fellowships for research and writing to individuals working in the area of philosophy of religion and
Christian philosophy. Its purpose is to encourage,
stimulate, and support the work of Christian philosophers.
The fruit of the Center's endeavor is clearly
evident in the publishing world. Two new series of
books, many of which are authored by current or former Center fellows, are especially worthy of note.
Under the general editorship of William P. Alston, Cornell University Press has founded the series "Cornell
Studies in the Philosophy of Religion" which will specialize in current work in philosophical theology and
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philosophy of religion in the Anglo-American or analytic philosophical tradition. Among the initial releases
in this series are Edward Wierenga's The Nature of God:
An Inquiry into Divine Attributes and William Hasker's
God, Time, and Knowledge. And the University of Notre
Dame Press now offers the "Library of Religious Philosophy" under the editorship of Thomas V. Morris, a
series aimed to . "stimulate the publication of books
characterized as much by genuine philosophical
insight, and even a spirit of wisdom, as by technical rigor and clarity of expression." Already published in this
series is Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement: Philosophical
and Theological Essays, edited by Ronald J. Feenstra and
Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. and Philip E. Devine's Relativism, Nihilism, and God. And Notre Dame continues
to support its "Notre Dame Studies in the Philosophy
of Religion," with new titles such as Christian
Philosophy, edited by Thomas P. Flint and Philosophy and
the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris.
What these events and series of publications
indicate is that there is in the philosophical world
today a hearty interest in and discussion of not only the
traditional issues of philosophy of religion but also of
the import and role of Christian commitment and
identity for philosophical theorizing. There is no uniform position being advocated by the participants in
the discussion. There is, rather, the acknowledgement
that these are issues which it is important and legitimate for Christian scholars to address.
Three Contemporary Christian Philosophers
It may be instructive for all who are interested
in the life and mission of a Christian university to listen
in on the conversation of Christian philosophers as
they discuss the bearing of Christian faith upon the discipline of philosophy. To this end I have selected three
prominent Christian philosophers who have addressed
this topic and whose advice may prove both stimulating
and helpful to those in other disciplines. All three are
active members of the Society of Christian Philosophers, two of them having served as president of the
society. Two, in their discussions, are explicitly addressing an audience of Christian philosophers, the third an
audience of professional philosophers and learned lay
readers.
In the fall of 1983, Alvin Plantinga was inaugurated as the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at
the University of Notre Dame. His philosophical reputation was established upon his careful analyses of the
ontological argument for God's existence, his discussion of the problem of evil (his most accessible
presentation of these issues appearing in God, Freedom
and Evil) and his innovative employment of a modal
logic in addressing these issues. But in his inaugural
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address, "Advice to Christian Philosophers" he turned
his attention to much broader concerns. The concluding words of that address were these:
We who are Christians and propose to be philosophers must
not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be Christians; we must strive to be Christian
philosophers. We must therefore pursue our projects with
integrity, independence, and Christian boldness. (Plantinga,
271)

Now this admonition to Christian boldness
ought certainly to be welcome to Lutheran ears, at
least while sinning, but one might well wonder what
Plantinga was trying to get at with his talk of being a
Christian philosopher. What does it mean to be a
Christian philosopher rather than a philosopher who
happens, incidentally, to be a Christian? Plantinga was,
in this speech, making two substantive suggestions: (1)
Christian philosophers ought to display more independence from the rest of the philosophical world, and (2)
the work of a Christian philosopher ought to display
more integrality, more unity, than has been the case in
the recent past. To this Plantinga added a word of
encouragement-Christian philosophers ought not to
be embarrassed about this calling but should engage
these issues with confidence and boldness, trusting that
God will do a good work with these reflections.
(Plantinga, 254)
In essence, Plantinga first declares the independence of the Christian philosopher from the
reigning trends and research programs in philosophy.
Christians ought not automatically take over the
research programs of the secular university. It is not
that the research programs of the secular university are
unimportant or uninteresting. It is, rather, that these
should not be the first priority or the central focus of
the Christian philosopher merely because these are the
issues of the secular academy. A Christian philosopher's identity is grounded foremost in her belonging
to a community of faith. And the questions, the concerns, the needs of the Christian community may not,
at any particular time, be identical with those of the
secular academy. A scholar's projects ought, then, to
be determined by her fundamental identity and for the
Christian this will require first of all a consideration of
the needs and the concerns of the Christian community.
There is a second reason why a Christian
philosopher ought not automatically to take over the
research projects of the secular academy according to
Plantinga. Many of these research projects do not
comport well with the Christian faith: "they fit in badly
with a Christian or theistic way of looking at the world."
This has not always been the case, but there is little
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doubt that this is how things now lie. Some research
programs may assume a human self with a considerably
better-developed brain but no more inherent dignity
and worth than a cockroach. Other theories may
implicitly assume that there is no meaning in reality
independent of that which we humans invest it with,
the consequence being that we are equals to God in
our creative power. But neither of these views fits well
with a Christian understanding of the self, and the
result is that a Christian scholar who embraces
research programs such as these cannot possibly exhibit the wholeness and integrality to which any
scholarship should aspire.
Instead, according to Plantinga, the Christian
philosopher ought to develop her own research projects and in these projects she has as much of an
intellectual right to start from Christian assumptions as
a secular philosopher has to start from naturalistic
ones. She is
under no obligation first to prove that theism follows from or
is probable with respect to premises widely accepted in the
contemporary secular philosophical academy before trying
to work out its implications for epistemology and ontology,
for ethics and logic, for aesthetics and philosophy of mathematics. (Plantinga, 1988, 160)
She may discover as she carries out her project the
need to modify some of the Christian beliefs with
which she started, just as some naturalistic physicists
have, in the course of their research, felt the need to
modifY some of their naturalistic starting points. But
there is nothing inappropriate in having Christian
beliefs in that initial body of beliefs from which one 's
theorizing originates.
Plantinga's view is, then, that the Christian
philosopher ought to start with Christian beliefs and
develop research programs and construct theories
which bear upon the well-being of the Christian community. And Plantinga suggests that there are three
kinds of projects which should at the current time be
attended to by Christian philosophers. Christian
philosophers should engage in more careful and
sophisticated philosophical reflection on specific Christian topics-the Trinity, the Incarnation, Atonement,
and Sin. Secondly, Christian philosophers should be
examining and criticizing contemporary ideas from an
explicitly Christian perspective. The third kind of project, and in Plantinga's eyes perhaps the most
important of the three, involves "developing from a
theistic perspective a full-orbed, articulate, systematic
set of answers to the main philosophical questions."
(Plantinga, 1988, 163)
Marilyn McCord Adams of UCLA, current
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president of the Society of Christian Philosophers,
recently used the tenth anniversary of the society in
1988 to offer her own advice to Christian philosophers.
Adams' focus here is upon the problem of evil. There
is an apparent inconsistency in a set of beliefs normally
held by Christians: (1) God exists, and is omnipotent,
omniscient and perfectly good and (2) There is evil.
The problem is that an omniscient and omnipotent
being would know of all the evil which exists and would
be able to eliminate it and a perfectly good being
would want to eliminate all the evil that it possibly
could. It would seem to follow, then, that either a God
who is omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good
does not exist or that evil does not exist, neither conclusion a particularly happy one for traditional
Christians.
Adams points out that this problem of evil can
be taken and responded to in two ways. One can take
it as David Hume and the recent philosopher J.L.
Mackie want the problem to be taken, as pointing out
the irrationality of Christian beliefs. If the problem is
taken in this way a theistic response is to mount a
defense against the charges, to construct a counterargument establishing that a perfectly good being
might have good reasons for not eliminating every possible evil. Perhaps the elimination of evil would entail
the elimination of some greater goods to which a perfectly good being is committed. Hence, it does not
follow that God as a perfectly good, omniscient and
omnipotent being does not exist. Alvin Plantinga himself has offered just this sort of defense.
The problem with responding to the problem
of evil in this way, according to Adams, is that in order
to show that a perfectly good being might be justified
in permitting the amounts of evil and the types of evil
which are present in the world one must appeal to
moral beliefs about goodness and greater and lesser
goods which are not shared by all and which themselves lack a demonstrative rational foundation. A
naturalist philosopher may not admit the value of or
even the existence of the types of goods which might
outweigh the evils with which we are familiar. And in
the absence of a set of moral values shared by all rational participants in the discussion the prospects for a
demonstrative defense are slim indeed.
Adams suggests instead that we take the problem of evil and other such problems aporetically, as
puzzles generated within a particular set of beliefs and
to be solved in reference to that set. With regard to
the problem of evil the attempt would be to try "to
articulate what we actually believe about God's goodness and how He is solving the problem of evil." As she
writes in her article on Duns Scotus:
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Christian metaphysics would examine the goodness of God as
He is in Himself, while soteriology would chart how God is
being good to created persons. Our attempted formulations
would then be measured for adequacy against both the
canons of consistency and the convictions of the wider Christian community. Failures would pinpoint more precisely
where and how evil is a problem for believers; and Faith seeking Understanding would send us in pursuit, with both heart
and philosophical mind, of a more profound grasp of the
mysterious goodness of God. To the extent that we succeed,
our solutions might not only exhibit the compossibility of
God and evil, but also commend God as a character worthy
of worship. If the atheistic arguer could not share our value
theory, he might at least gain a better understanding of our
position or even come to appreciate how reasonable people
could find it attractive. (Adams, 1987, 487)
Thus, for Adams as for Plantinga, the task of the
Christian philosopher is to theorize in light of her
Christian beliefs, in this case beliefs about goodness
and moral value and whether a being such as God
could have moral obligations, aware of the puzzles
generated by her set of beliefs. Her theorizing is not
sectarian insofar as she offers that theorizing to the
wider community mindful that even as the works of the
atheological philosophers Hume and Mackie have lent
clarity and insight to her project, so may her project
lend clarity and insight to others.
Alasdair Macintyre of the University of Notre
Dame is undoubtedly the most discussed philosopher
working in the area of moral philosophy today. First in
After Virtue (1981) and more recently in Wlwse]ustice7
Which Rationality? (1988) he has charted the failures of
Enlightenment moral philosophy and directed us to
take seriously the role of "tradition-based" theorizing.
Macintyre begins After Virtue by noting the extent of
moral disagreement present today not only in our
everyday life but in academic philosophy. The amount
and the extent of disagreement cannot but be confusing in light of Enlightenment confidence in the power
of human reason and the ability to establish rational
standards of morality. Contemporary philosophers
tend to retain allegiance to a particular moral theory
and to assert the rational superiority of one theory over
another but their inability to state clearly just what that
rational superiority consists in and to persuade fellow
philosophers, apparently rational, to embrace their
theory suggests that, their claims to the contrary
notwithstanding, their project of constructing a rationally founded moral theory has failed.
One response to this failure is to embrace a
relativism which claims that any morality or rationality
is just as good as any other and to refuse to make either
positive or negative assessments of alternative traditions. But Macintyre proposes an alternative to
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relativism. He suggests that we recognize that there
are no universally shared standards of rational justification and that we acknowledge the embeddedness of all
rational inquiry in particular traditions.
How does Macintyre avoid an incipient relativism? His view is not, in fact, that one tradition is just
as good as another. Many traditions will fail by their
own internal standards. And, even given the fact that
we have, say, two competing traditions neither of which
has failed by its own internal standards of rational justification, it will not follow that one is no more true than
the other, only that we may not be in a position to
judge which of the two is superior. Macintyre is not, as
I read him, committed to the view that there are no
standards of truth or rational justification independent
of traditions, but rather to the view that we have no
demonstrative access to such standards. But there may
be other rational creatures, for example, God, who
know the standards. The point is, thus, not that there
are no true standards of rational justification but
rather that there are no demonstrably true standards.
The task for the contemporary philosopher
and student according to Macintyre is to explore and
develop both the poverty and the riches of his or her
tradition, to plumb it for its adequacy in addressing the
problems which he or she confronts or, in the absence
of a commitment to a particular tradition, to locate
one. Confronted by fragments of multiple social and
intellectual traditions, each making a claim upon one's
allegiance, how is the decision to identify with a particular tradition to be made? Macintyre suggests that that
decision should be based upon one's self-understanding and self-knowledge; that is, you embrace for
exploration and understanding that tradition which
comports best with who you understand yourself to be.
This is no guarantee that one will remain within that
tradition, for the tradition may ultimately fail to satisfy
its own standards of rational justification. It does, in
any case, remove the illusion that tradition-commitment can be based upon some neutral standards of
rational justification which can be applied to all traditions.
Each of these three Christian philosophers,
then, advocates the legitimacy of a Christian
philosopher's doing her philosophy from within the
Christian tradition, addressing certain problems which
confront the Christian community or working on puzzles generated by Christian beliefs. And it is important
to recognize that in waging the case for this legitimacy,
each assumes the failure of foundationalism, the view
that there exists a body of premises known to be certain and from which, employing methods of reasoning
themselves known with certainty to be reliable, we can
arrive at other certain beliefs.
14

It would take us too far afield at this point to
examine the arguments against foundationalism but if
foundationalism is not a failure, that is to say, if there is
indeed a body of truths to which all rational people
would agree and from which interesting, and not merely trivial, conclusions can be drawn, then things will
look much different for the Christian philosopher.
Then it will be unclear why her projects qua philosopher should differ from those who are not Christian. I
am convinced, along with our three partners in the
conversation, that foundationalism has failed and that
this makes "tradition-based inquiry" all the more
important. But this is not a belief shared by all philosophers. (For a somewhat less enthusiastic response to
Macintyre's project see James Bachman's 1988 essay in
The Cresset.)
Philosophy and the Christian University
In conclusion I want to think briefly about
what the doing of philosophy might look like at a
Lutheran university if we were to take something like
what Plantinga, Adams and Macintyre argue to be correct. We identify ourselves as a Christian institution
and by far the vast majority of our students stand in
some relation to the Christian tradition. I would argue
that in light of this a Christian university owes these
students at least five things: (1) an awareness about
and an understanding of the central problems of
human existence which have puzzled philosophers
through the centuries; (2) an examination and exploration of past Christian attempts at addressing these
problems; (3) an identification of the central issues
that confront reflective Christians today and an
attempt to address these questions in light of Christian
beliefs; (4) a familiarity with alternative philosophical
traditions and worldviews and an understanding of the
distinctiveness of the Christian tradition as well as that
which it shares with other traditions; (5) training in
the philosophical skills which will equip the student for
addressing these problems on her own and for anticipating problems which may confront the Christian
community in the future.
This, I think, is what the Christian university
owes its Christian students when it comes to philosophy
education. But the Christian university also has its obligations to those students who have rejected the
Christian tradition or who embrace alternative traditions or who have not located their tradition as well.
And that obligation is best satisfied not by offering
"equal" training in other traditions, not by minimizing
or ignoring the identity of either instructor or students, but by welcoming the other to listen in on the
conversation of the Christian tradition and to explore
his or her own tradition in light of the challenges the
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Christian tradition faces as well as in light of the challenges the Christian tradition may put to him. Hence,
the same sort of training which will satisfY our duties to
the Christian student will, when provided by honest
and humble and fair individuals, redound with benefits
to those who stand outside the tradition.
Does a Lutheran university owe its students anything more when it comes to the study of philosophy?
We could promise our students a careful examination
of what the great Lutheran philosophers have said on
every topic we address in philosophy without it costing
us too much in the way of class time. But, in all seriousness, I do think we as a Lutheran university fail our
students if we do not offer them some exposure to
Lutheran philosophers, which is to say Kierkegaard .
And it is not because I have any special affinity for his
work that I say this. But Kierkegaard is a significant
philosopher and his presence and only his presence as
a great Lutheran philosopher (we would do well to
attempt to reclaim St. Augustine as a Lutheran philos~
pher) tells us something that we may need to know
about philosophy and how Lutherans have historically
understood Christian engagement in it.
It is an exciting time to be a philosopher and
to be a Christian philosopher. It is a time, I think, in
which Christian philosophers, while ever mindful of
both the whorish character of much philosophy and
our own whoremongering proclivities are, nevertheless, mightily convinced of our own enfeebled
existence and of philosophy's identity as a magnificent
and awe-inspiring nurse. We ought to be humble and
cautious, lest we claim more for Christian philosophy
than we are entitled to. But there is no virtue in claiming less.O
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''WE''?

Kevin Paul Geiman

Alasdair Macintyre concluded his provocative book,
After Virtue, with the following observations:
It is always dangerous to draw too precise parallels
between one historical period and another; and among the
most misleading of such parallels are those which have been
drawn between our age in Europe and North America and
the epoch in which the Roman empire declined into the
Dark Ages. Nonetheless certain parallels there are . A crucial
turning point in that earlier history occurred when men and
women of good will turned aside the task of shoring up the
Roman imperium and ceased to ident:il}' the continuation of
civility and moral community with the maintenance of that
imperium. What they set themselves to achieve insteadoften not recognizing fully what they were doing-was the
construction of new forms of community within which the
moral life could be sustained so that both morality and civility might survive the coming ages of barbarism and
darkness .. .. This time however the barbarians are not waiting
beyond the frontiers; they have already been governing us
for quite some time .. . We are waiting not for a Godot, but for
another --<ioubtless very different-St. Benedict.

The two most interesting features of Macintyre's
diagnosis and prognosis are the phrases, "not recognizing fully what they were doing" and "ceased to
identify the continuation of civility and moral community with the maintenance of [the] imperium," for he
takes these to be not only integral dimensions of Benedict and his followers' self-understanding but a model
for those who would seek to have done with the present day imperium as well. Simply put, the claim is that
Kevin Geiman has recently joined the Department of Philosrr
phy at VU, having completed his doctoral work at Washington
University in St. Louis. His interest in contemporary Eurrr
pean political philosophy has been strengthened by study in
Paris and Frankfurt.
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persons should not seek to justify their actions with
respect to the currently obtaining social order and that
they couldn't give such an account even if they wanted
to. Just action is not a matter of claims and their legitimation; it is done. There is something appealingalmost romantic-about Macintyre's suggestion, amplified by the fact that he refers to Benedict. Perhaps
saints have that way about them. This romanticism is
heightened, for example, in Francis of Assisi who, in
his few writings, speaks of "leaving the world" ( exire de
saeculo) with no particular plan of action or statement
of principle to guide him ("Nobody told me what I was
to do"). Clearly there is an element of the a-rational
here, and Francis-though not Benedict-openly
called himself a fool (pazzo). Leaving the established
order of power, wealth and secure knowledge is indeed
a foolhardy project. Unless, of course, there is a wisdom in this madness.
There is much talk bandied about these days
praising the idea of turning one's attention from questions of normativity, justification, foundations, and so
forth toward social practice. One might well claim
that this is the philosophical theme of the postwar in tellectual community, bridging the apparent split
between the "analytic" and "Continental" camps. The
challenges to any normative standpoint raised by the
heightened awareness oflanguage's "holidays," the suspicions surrounding a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical
theory of historical transformation, and the sheer
absurdity of many of the world events of this century
have led philosophers to focus attention away from
what one says about truth, justice and goodness to the
ways in which one acts, the structure of action and the
forms of narrative practice. Normative philosophy
gives way to the sociology of knowledge, and the quest
for foundations is recast in the terms of a never-ending
The Cresset

conversation of humankind. The intentions are good;
the arguments (when they are provided) are generally
not, for the invocation of "social practice" is already a
philosophical move, not a substitute for or successor to
philosophical reflection and analysis. After all, what is
social practice or social action? What are its characteristics?
One way of approaching these questions is to
ask another: Can there be an order of action without a
corresponding order of things? Actions and practices
do not occur in a vacuum, and the transitivity of the
majority of our verbs indicates that among the determining characteristics of any given action are both the
object toward which that action is directed and the
object domain in which that action is carried out. One
kicks-a ball. One eats-dinner-at a table-with
knife and fork. These trite examples by which one
learns to diagram sentences also teach us something
about actions generally, namely that they do not occur
without a world in which the possibility of their being
carried out is secured and in which the actor modifies
familiar actions and discovers the possibilities for new
ones. The order of things that is germane to the given
action also figures in the evaluation of that action.
One who puts shot well will have to do more than
move his body in a particularly noteworthy fashion; the
shot will have to have gone some distance. Similarly,
building a better mousetrap is not simply a matter of
applying new technologies, for no matter how sophisticated the gadget, it is not a better mousetrap if the
rodents continue to escape. These are, of course, commonplaces.
But is the case much different when, instead of
bodily action, social action is the point of focus? Here
the problem is compounded by the fact that both the
context and object of our actions are not simply material objects (balls, food) but ourselves and our
relationships as well, and it is at this point that the turn
to social practice opens up the door to questions concerning the nature of these relationships, the status of
their interconnection and their functional contribution to the formation of the context of action.
Perhaps the most fundamental problem concerns the status of the actors and their role in
implementing or carrying out their various activities,
and it comes as no surprise that a theory of social practices generally carries with it its own supporting
sociology, philosophical anthropology or, at the limit,
social ontology, defining the nature of the actors themselves and specifying appropriate action capabilities.
Historically these accounts were often made in binary
terms. The account of the life of the polis in Aristotle's
Politics presupposed the Athenian aristocracy and the
slaves, and Augustine's City of God brought the NeoMarch, 1990

Platonic Christian distinction between the "higher"
and "lower" levels of existence to bear on the account
of social formations. There was enough strength in
this model to influence, many centuries later, Leibniz's
cosmologically and ethically oriented "Two Kingdoms"
schema, in which mechanism and libertinism were
contrasted to teleology and the life of the hommes honnetes. Similarly, the Marxist model of social
transformation ultimately rests on a two-level conception of society-proletariat on the one side and
capitalist on the other.
There is philosophical motivation for these
models that share the common denominator of a twoleveled concept of social formation. It lies in the
concern not only to describe social action generally but
to prescribe such social action that is considered to be
normatively correct or just and to condemn its opposite. To the denizen of the City of God and to the
proletariat, for example, belonged both the capability
and the responsibility for the overall transformation of
the social environment from what it was to what it
should become. This motivation can also be the
Achilles heel of a normative social theory, for the critical stance that is won on this basis runs at a pace other
than that of the social domain; social members and
their actions do not fall pell-mell into order on one or
the other of two sides. Hence when the normative theory is applied as a standard for decision-making and
evaluation in the social world it often loses its ability to
function as a guide and yardstick. Of course, no rule
will cover all applications, but it is another thing altogether to establish a rule that has none, or so few as to
lose sight of the fact that it is social theory with which
one is concerned. Without the aristocracy, the communion of saints, the republic of honnetes or the
proletariat, the normative dimension of the theories
just mentioned appears to be but another ideological
weapon pressed into the service of the interests of
some social group.
Must this be the case? Maurice Merleau-Ponty
suggests that
if it is true that as soon as philosophy ... prejudges what it will

find, then once again it must recommence everything, reject
the instruments reflection and intuition have provided themselves, and install itself in a locus where they have not yet
been distinguished, in experiences that have not yet been
'worked over.' (The Visible and the Invisible, 130)
Theodor Adorno was less polite:
'Thought must. .. be ready to think against itself. Unless
willing to measure itself against those extreme situations
which elude conceptual formulation, thought assumes from
the outset the character of a mere accompaniment-similar
17

to the background music with which the SS officers liked to
drown out the screams of their victims. (Negative Dialectics,

365)

Perhaps it is time-if only for a short while-to invert
Marx's Xlth Thesis on Feuerbach, for changing the
world means not only developing the tools with which
to do it but understanding the nature of the task at
hand as well. Far from confirming the "end of philosophy" (pace Rorty), the turn to social practice
reconfirms the necessity of philosophical interrogation
if it is to avoid being background music for terror.
In recent years there has been a proliferation
of writing on the merits of communitarian thinking
and social organization as a way of getting out of this
impasse in critical social thought. Macintyre's After
Virtue, Jurgen Habermas' The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity, and Richard Rorty's various writings all have
as the point of their focus the conceptualization of participatory structures that serve to provide both the
ground of social cohesion and the critical apparatus
for its internal transformation. , For Macintyre, this
focus is on the development of communities capable of
sustaining the "moral life" against the onslaught of
rampant utilitarianism and empty formalism. For
Habermas, this centers on a reformulation of the
Husserlian concept of the lifeworld, the world of everyday lived experience. On this account, the lifeworld is
used "as a resource from which interaction participants
support utterances capable of reaching consensus ....
To this extent, concrete forms of life replace transcendental consciousness in its function of creating unity."
(Haber mas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 326)
Rorty has suggested that one is well advised to continue
with the project of social engineering as it has been
carried out on the North American continent during
the last three hundred years. The project of social
engineering is less concerned with questions concerning normative practices and their justification as it is
with the "attempt to make concrete concerns with the
daily problems of one's community ... the substitute for
traditional religion." (Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard
on Postmodernity," 174)
Common to all three views is the claim that
one needs to recover some sense of community identification in order to overcome the loss of meaning and
social stability that are taken to be characteristic of the
modern age. Further, such communities, because they
function holistically, do not run the danger that previous conceptions of the social bond ran into, namely,
the determination of a discrete agent of social transformation. Now, the task of social regulation and
development is spread across the entire community
through a common moral structure (Macintyre's
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"virtues"), a common form of social integration
(Habermas' "communicative action") or a common
project (Rorty's "social engineering").
While each of these revisions of social theory
poses interesting problems worth careful consideration, the fallout of these discussions leads this writer to
believe that what is at stake is, as one thinker has
already suggested, "the manufacture of a subject that is
authorized to say 'we'." Uean-Francois Lyotard, Just
Gaming, p. 81) By this is meant the conceptual elucidation of a social arrangement such that the final court of
appeal for settling disputes would not consist in a fact
of human nature or a metaphysical/theological dogma
but the active consensus of all parties. Examples
abound, from the "we" of "We the people" to the "we"
of popular petition ("We, the undersigned, etc.") to the
"we" of "our community /neighborhood/ country." In
each of these examples, the "we" authorizes the claims
made in its name and bears full responsibility for them.
Of course, this is not a novel idea; it has its origins in
the social contract theories of early modernity. And as
in those theories, the "we" is inviolable.
However, it must be objected that the invocation of a "we" does not end discussion; it introduces a
presupposition that requires further interrogation. But
is it possible to interrogate the "we" without begging
the question? All too often one falls back on some
identifiable, existing community or another, from MacIntyre's thickly veiled defense of the Irish Republican
Army to Jurgen Habermas' thinly veiled defense of
German social democracy and Richard Rorty's poorly
veiled defense of the North Atlantic alliance. What is
troublesome about this is not that one is substituting a
concrete manifestation for a regulative norm. This is
always a danger and is easily corrected. What is troublesome is that one cannot fail to speak of some "we"
or another without at the same time speaking of a
"they;" it's a matter of the pragmatics oflanguage. And
as soon as one has introduced the "they," is it not the
case that there is already at work some principle of
exclusion and social division at work?
Perhaps one might seek to avoid this difficulty
by indicating that the "we" in question is not limited,
that it is a universal "we" that admits of no "they." But
is it not a far-fetched claim that there is some group to
which all, irrespective of their own activity and selfunderstanding, belong? Clearly at present there is no
such universal community to which everyone will admit
membership. At best one can hold this out as a goal to
be achieved, an end toward which all ought to direct
their action. But if this is the case, then what one is
dealing with is a prescriptive, normative claim. Such
claims cannot function as premises in an argument, for
any number of plans of action can be attached to a preThe Oresset

scriptive as formal (and as empty) as "All ought to
become a "we."
Still, one should not underestimate the rather
widespread social prognosis which serves as a motivation for these efforts. The prognosis. is that we are not
very well off at all. Macintyre premises his views with
the assertion of a wide-spread ignorance of the very
terms we use to discuss moral qualities and on the
"barbarian" rule of present-day government. Habermas is interested in providing an alternative to what he
takes to be the confused "new conflicts [that] flare up
around ... questions concerning the grammar of forms
of life." (Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, II,
392) According to Habermas, the breakdown of classical world-views and the expansion of the political and
monetary spheres now leaves us without sufficient
resources to develop a coherent, rational social formation. Habermas-perhaps only too acutely aware of
the reactionary undercurrent in the political environment in the Federal Republic-has a vested interest in
combating, with all the rigor philosophy can muster,
any attempt at maintaining or reviving a conservative
politics that can lead back to fascism.
The question is whether things are as bleak as
some of our contemporary authors contend. Now
Lyotard counters that while
this breaking up ... leads to what some authors analyze in
terms of the dissolution of the social bond and the disintegration of social aggregates into a mass of individual atoms
thrown into the absurdity of Brownian motion, [n] othing of
the kind is happening. (The Postmodern Condition, 15)
Nothing of the kind is happening, because the nature
of the social bond is not such that when the philosophical (or social) system of regulation breaks down chaos
results. Indeed, there is no such system to begin with.
This ideal is a left-over from the nineteenth century
when it was felt that society should form some kind of
organic whole with a determinate teleological framework. The view that "Brownian motion"-a random
orderless movement of social particles-will result
from the absence of such a communal system is,
Lyotard claims, "haunted by the paradisaic representation of a lost 'organic' society," which we are then
counseled to regain or bring into existence.
Perhaps what is required, then, is not the construction of new communities (new "we's") that will
carry on the work of civility and morals now that the
big "we" of the imperium has crumbled. This notion
attests more to its origin in philosophical systems than
to the requirements of the complexity of social life.
Rather what might be required is a form of thought
and action that looks for and listens to what Michel
March, 1990

Foucault refers to as the "interruptions, [the] gaps,
those small things of little value ... those things said on
the great surface of the empire." (Language, CounterMemory, Practice, 172) Because the social order is not
and cannot be fixed, the determination of appropriate
agents and courses of action requires that one enter
into the thick of things and be subject to the demands
of a world where fortune holds sway. Here one must
not prejudice the nature of what one will find, but
rather must be willing to let the activity of the day and,
above all, the various and sundry views and actions of
others come to expression and make their impression.
Now it might be objected that any group, no
matter how perverse one might fmd its practices and
views, is to be accorded place under this conception of
marginality. The critic will perhaps have in mind the
National Socialists or the SDS, the advocates of an
increased military budget or the proponents of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the "Pro-Choice" or the
"Pro-Life" groups, the National Rifle Association or the
gun control lobby. The critic may be uneasy about the
apparent consequence of the view being advocated
that these groups shall be allowed to pursue their aims
and activities without qualification. Now one may have
reasons for not participating in any of the groups just
mentioned. One may seek to challenge the positions,
to propose alternative plans of action and to criticize
fundamental assumptions. What is at stake is that one
does not choose (like Leibniz' God) from among the
spectrum of ideally possible actions, implementing just
the one that is necessarily the best possible. One is not
a demiurge; one is human, and decisions in the social
domain, if they are not to be ideological, are to be
informed by the given conditions and the positions
available in the social domain. Truth, goodness and
beauty are not partisan matters.
This is not simply an appeal for an undogmatic
posture; a call for openness that neglects categories
and structures runs the risk of underwriting a general
stupidity, where one neither knows what one does nor
knows how one does it. Rather, at issue is a conception
of justice. Recent attempts to show that futility of pitting "good" against "bad" social practices and
tendencies have been criticized as being devoid of any
moral or political orientation. The point here is that
unless one specifies, either structurally or in terms of
its effects, the determinate characteristics of normative
action, one cannot hope to maintain a defensible critical stance. I tend to disagree with this position. It
seems that it would be possible to locate a political and
moral orientation in the everyday practice of agents
without introducing structural or attitudinal dualisms
into those practices, precisely on the grounds that the
very introduction of these distinctions already preju19

dices the characterization of those social actors and
curtails their actions. I would follow Lyotard's lead
when he writes that
there are language games in which the important thing is to
listen, in which the rule deals with audition. Such a game is
the game of the just. And in this game, one speaks only inasmuch as one listens, that is, one speaks as a listener, and not
as an author." (Lyotard,just Gaming, 71-72)
Only by listening to (which is not the same as hearing)
the polyphony of voices can one continue to play the
game of justice. The only "we" worth having, then, is
one that continually faces the prospect of its own dissolution in acknowledging the possible truth of others'
discourse and actions.
I am asked to say something about philosophy
and Christianity, about "faith" and "reason." The for~
going remarks apply particularly to the putative "we" of
Christianity. A Christian "we" that does not open itself
to the "non-we," be it non-Christians, non-genderproper-Christians and non-denominationally-properChristians, suffers from the Sitzjleisch that Nietzsche
(for once right on the money) thought to be precisely
the "sin against the Holy Spirit," the one that can never
be forgiven because channels for the Spirit's actions
have been actively denied. Such a "we," proceeding
from and returning to itself, can only result in rearguard action to maintain a sphere of immediacy and
integrity. Such a "we," destined to operate in secrecy
and silence, manifests the fear that is the opposite of
justice, for it does not allow the question of justice to
be raised and discussed. Such a "we," ever-mindful of
its own preservation, rejects the good gift of brokenness and emptiness that has been offered it and, with
that gift, the life it might have hoped to attain.
The purpose of the Christian "we" is to
become obsolete, to carry out such activity and to be in
such a way that it become impossible to contrast a
Christian "we" to a non-Christian "they." Of course this
author (and everyone else for that matter) knows nothing of what such a condition would look like. Marx
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had thought that capitalism was pregnant with the
transformations that would allow the passage to socialism. He was only partially right, for as the
development of the economy over the last hundred
years has shown, what Marx called "capitalism" was
actually pregnant with many diverse forms of social and
productive relations. The same would hold true for
transformations in all spheres of life and in all forms of
human association. Historical development is not linear but a pattern of the successive implementation of
one or several of a range of possibilities. It is clear that
here one does not recognize fully what one is doing,
but perhaps it is here that "faith" and "reason" become
indistinguishable from one another. Perhaps. 0
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The Disappeared
When our plane lands in El Salvador,
We see low-sitting sandbag forts line
The runways; dark barrels point out
In each direction. The North American
Poets deplane first, all seriously costumedBandanas and sandals. They are here,
They say, to witness the struggle, to be
At one with it; but, alas, they have
Only three days, must leave, weather
permitting, all their testimony ready
For the engagements their agents have arranged.

Meanwhile, we read that the mothers
Continue to march in Buenos Aires.
The faces of sons and daughters
Hang from cords around the necks
Of these women; they refuse to stop
Marching, refuse to return home.
Slowly strangling from loss, they refuse
And refuse ...

We decide not to leave the plane,
And we leave El Salvador; we have
Seen what we needed to see
And we promise ourselves we'll say
Nothing about this until the bones
Of the missing appear again,
Cradled in their mothers' arms.

Robert Pawlowski
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The First Freedom
Joe Patrick Bean

For the benefit of Hungarians
who do not read English but
nonetheless would like to read the
articles, Playboy magazine is now
published in Magyar. This fact,
however trivial its subject, points
to a stunning explosion of freedom of expression across Europe
in 1989 and early 1990.
Also in Hungary, Colonel lmre
Bokor's scathing expose of corruption among his nation's top
military officers, Princes in Uniform,
is selling so fast that the publishers
can't print enough copies. Since
its start in Budapest in February of
1989, Mai Nap, Hungary's first
independent newspaper, mixing
tabloid-style sensationalism with
political and legal topics, has doubled its circulation to 100,000.
In Romania, leaders of December's revolt against Nicolae
Ceausescu took over state television and renamed it Television
Free Romania (TRL), broadcast-

Joe Patrick Bean, an assistant prafessor of history and journalism at
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Cresset.
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ing the nation's unfolding revolutionary upheaval live and
uncensored. TRL also televised
the trial of Ceausescu and his wife,
Elena, and pictures of their bulletridden corpses after their
executions. And for the first time
in Romania since 1947, TRL and
state radio broadcast a live Christmas service from Bucharest's
Patriarhie Cathedral.
The official Romanian government press agency, Agerpress,
disbanded after the Ceausescus'
overthrow, and in its place, the
governing National Salvation
Council created a new press service, Rompress, intended to be
free of state control. And two new
newspapers recently began publication in Bucharest, laying the
foundation for a free press in
Romania.
East Germany's Communist
Party youth newspaper, Junge Welt,
in October published a letter by
dissident author Hermann Kant
that helped topple hard-line dictator Eric Honecker. The paper
subsequently exposed the privileged lifestyle Honecker and the
country's other former leaders
had enjoyed in their exclusive
Wand-litz compound outside of
East Berlin. Berliner Zeitung, East
Berlin's Communist Party newspaper, also published exhaustive
accounts of the deposed regime's
financial corruption, and state
television broadcast similar
reports.
Shortly before Czechoslovakia's
old regime fell from power, and
former prisoner Vaclav Havel was
elected president, state television
began broadcasting coverage of
anti-government demonstrations
in Prague's Wenceslas Square. A
few weeks later, state television
unveiled two new, uncensored
political programs, including
Open Screen, an hour-long,
thrice-weekly forum that will provide all citizens and political
groups access to the airwaves to

present their views to the nation.
The leading Soviet literary
magazine, Novy Mir, in August
began publishing installments of
exiled Nobel laureate Alexander
Solzhenitsyn 's chronicle of Stalinist repression,
The Gulag
Archipelago. By October, Gulag
had made its way onto the reading list of one 11th grade Moscow
history class. Another literary
magazine, Oktyabr, has published
Vasily Grossman's short novel, Forever Flowing, charging that political
terror and repression are the legacy of Vladimir I. Lenin, the Soviet
Union's founding father and
greatest national hero.
A growing number of Soviet
newspapers are taking advantage
of President Mikail Gorbachev's
policy of glasnost to publish
scathing ex-poses of Stalin's reign
of terror and even to criticize the
current government. Prominent
among them is the weekly Argumenty i Fakty, which is the world's
best-selling newspaper, with a circulation of 26 million copies. Also
as a result of Gorbachev's policies,
leading literary figures last spring
began work to establish a Soviet
chapter of PEN, the international
writers' organization best known
for its opposition to censorship.
Eastern Europeans have very
little experience with democracy
or freedom, which, as they are discovering, do not come fully
assembled with batteries included.
Yet their decades without it have
taught them that freedom of
expression is the essential first
freedom, without which other liberties are trivial and fleeting. At
the same time Eastern Europeans
are struggling, sometimes dying,
to expand freedom of expression,
some Americans unfortunately are
working with similar fervor to limit it in this country.
The Rev. Donald Wildman of
Tupelo, Mississippi, and his
groups, the American Family Association and Christian Leaders for
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Responsible Television, are trying
to "clean up" network television by
targeting shows such as The Wonder Years, Full House, Cheers, Murphy
Brown and AIF as morally objectionable. Wildmon denounced The
Wonder Years, ABC's wholesome
and insightful Emmy-winning
show about a boy growing up in
the late 60s because it "teaches
that sex is the obsession of preteens." A Wildmon supporter
wrote, in a letter toThe Houston
Post, that this show's "sex scenes
were some of the most explicit I
have seen. And on prime time!
Someone needs to be a watchdog,
and I am grateful to Mr.
Wildmon."
The Orlando, Florida, Christian
televsion station WACX dropped
the Dallas-based children's program Mr. Peppermint from its
schedule last spring after receiving
complaints about the show. In
one episode, the program showed
film of Japanese children and
their surroundings. The camera
briefly recorded footage of a statue of the Buddha, which offended
viewers called a "graven image."
Others objected to an extraterrestrial character named Kelli Green,
who came to Earth to teach children not to litter, saying that the
fictional alien promotes "mysticism."
Multimedia Cablevision bowed
to pressure from fundamentalist
religious groups last fall when it
chose not to broadcast The Last
Temptation of Christ on the Cinemax pay-movie channel in
Oklahoma, Kansas and North Carolina. Some of the nation's
leading video-rental chains also
decided not even to stock the controversial movie when it was
released on videocassette last summer.
Jesse Helms, with other congressional conservatives, tried last
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summer to gut the National
Endowment for the Arts, but failing in his attempt to do that,
Helms is now using his staff to
investigate NEA grant applications. He apparently hopes this
pressure will cause NEA officials
to back away from funding art projects that he might consider
objectionable, or that could cause
any
controversy
for
the
beleagured agency.
Missouri State Representative
Jean Dixon and a group of local
religious leaders tried to keep the
drama department of Southwest
Missouri State University from
staging Larry Kramer's widely
acclaimed play about AIDS, The
Normal Hear~ in November of last
year. During the heated controversy about the play, the home of a
student leader supporting the production burned. Investigators
believe the fire was deliberately
set. And when school administrators and regents refused to cancel
the drama, its opponents said they
would try to persuade the Missouri General Assembly to cut the
university's state appropriations.
When a high-ranking FBI
bureaucrat last year wrote a letter
on official stationery to the head
of Priority Records protesting the
lyrics of a song by the rap group
N.W.A., the music industry got a
chilling message: the FBI is now
in the business of monitoring rock
lyrics.
Canadian author Margaret
Atwood's celebrated 1986 novel,
The Handmaid's Tale, was removed
from an English class at Houston's
Lamar High School last September after parents objected to what
they called offensive language.
Ironically, and probably not coincidentally, Handmaid's Tale is a
powerful and not altogether unrealistic account of a futuristic
society where right-wing fanatics

have seized control of the United
States government and taken all
legal and political rights away
from women, reducing them to
the status of breeding stock. During the 1988-89 academic year,
172 attempts at or actual incidents
of book banning occurred in public schools in 42 states; most cases
involved offensive language, and
few accusers had bothered to read
the books they wanted to ban.
Last year, Americans celebrated
the 200th anniversary of the Bill
of Rights, including the all-important First Amendment. The
examples noted above sadly are
but a small number of censorship
attempts across the United States
during 1989, clearly showing that
many Americans still have much
to learn about the precious rights
this amendment guarantees, and
about the crucial importance of
freedom of expression in a democratic society.
Eastern Europeans don't have
nearly as much experience with
democracy as Americans do, but,
ironically, they offer this country a
timely lesson. The alternative to a
society where freedom of expression is zealously protected,
Eastern Europeans might say, is
not one any sane person would
willingly choose. Yet, too many
Americans are complacent accomplices in the censorial activities of
Wildmon, Helms and the rest.
If Vaclav Havel, or Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, Imre Bokor or Hermann Kant, the editors of
Argumenty i Fakty or the producers
and directors of Television Free
Romania were to ask why so few
Americans are willing to confront
the dangerous and increasingly
frequent assaults on free expression in this country, what would
the answer be? And would it be
too late? 0
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Everybody's Turn
Reno Juneja

There must be many ways to
take the pulse of a nation and
many are recorded in these
monthly columns of The Cresset.
As a relative novice at this brand
of cultural commentary, I am still
learning to devise antennae.
When all else fails, true to the
predilection of someone who lives
by books and sometimes in books,
I turn to the printed page. Surely,
what we write and what we read
must be as true an index as any of
the state of this nation's mind and
heart The proliferation of books
of all kinds and on all subjects
makes it difficult to clearly demarcate trends, but the best seller lists
of The New York Times Book Review
remain a handy tool. Lately, my
reading of the nonfiction best seller lists in particular has pointed to
a curious phenomenon: a large
proportion of the books the American public is reading so avidly are
autobiographical books about the
public and personal lives of
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celebrities and personalities. It
seems that almost anyone who has
ever held a public office of note or
achieved notoriety or fame has
written or will set out to write a
book. Let me give you a list compiled from a random sampling
from three recent issues of The
New York Times Book Review: Child
Star, by Shirley Temple; Roseanne,
by Roseanne Barr; It's Always Something, by Gilda Radner; Liar's
Poker, by Michael Lewis; Confessions
of An S. O.B., by Al Neuharth;
Drive, by Larry Bird; Education of A
Wandering Man,
by Louis
L'Amour; All My Best Friends, by
George Burns; Bo, by Bo Schembechler; Miles, by Miles Davis; Pete
Rose: My Story by Pete Rose; and, of
course, Nancy Reagan's My Turn.
You may remember that the last
one was preceded by books from
Don Regan and Michael Deaver.
Autobiography is not a
new form. St. Augustine wrote
his Confessions in the fourth century A.D. and thereafter many
notables, literary and otherwise
have confessed themselves in writing. The word autobiography,
however, is of fairly recent
coinage, and the invention of the
name signals the emergence of
autobiography as an increasingly
popular vehicle of self-expression.
The word appears towards the
beginning of the nineteenth century, and by 1964 Bonamy Dobree
has claimed autobiographies as
"the most entrancing of books."
Autobiography is a compound of
three Greek roots-auto (self), bio
(life), and graphy (writing). This
conjunction of self and life or self
and history suggests the increasing appeal of autobiography for
this nation and this culture. In

the Library of Congress classification system, autobiography is a
subspecies of biography, and biography a branch of the "Auxiliary
Sciences of History." A nation
with a fragile and tenuous sense of
history, a nation self-consciously
creating its self and its history,
must find the self-creations of
autobiography almost a psychological necessity.
Walk into the magazine
section of the drugstore and you
will find a multitude of so-called
peoples' magazines that are but
variations of True Confessions.
Glance at the pages of tabloids
like The National Enquirer and you
will find disclosure after extraordinary disclosure of people's
personal lives. People seem to
need little prompting to launch
into narratives of self. More and
more people are taking up the
pen to tell their story; more and
more people think that they have
a story worth telling. That this
should be so is, I think, because
autobiography is particularly suited to the American experience
and temperament
There are, of course, a lot
of great autobiographies from other cultures and nations as well.
But it is most so in America that
the self must achieve coherence
and definition without mediation
from, or interference from, powerfully existing traditions,
communities, and beliefs. American autobiography comes into its
own with works like Benjamin
Franklin's Autobiography and Henry Adams' The Education of Henry
Adams. These men are building a
nation, creating a national character as it were, and connecting
their self through their writing to
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the life of the nation. These are
people discovering and articulating a self that is, in some ways,
expressive of their moment in history. In autobiographies of those
like Franklin and Adams, the writing about self is a self-consciously
cultural act appropriate to the
building of a new nation.
Today, autobiography
thrives among new immigrant
groups and among minorities still
attempting to seize their moment
in history, still seeking to project
themselves on the nation's consciousness through such works of
self-definition. Vladimir Nobokov
writes Speak, Memory; Mary Antin
writes The Promised Land; Alfred
Kazin writes A Walker in the City;
Maxine Hong Kingston writes The
Woman Warrior. Most recently I
read a favorable review of Eva
Hoffman's Lost in Translation: A
Life in New Language which the
reviewer describes as a looking
backward to Hoffman's childhood
in Poland and to emigration to
the U.S., an attempt to repair,
through the act of writing the
autobiography, those losses in the
self that the book laments. The
autobiographies of black writers as
diverse as Malcolm X and Maya
Angelou share a sharply etched
historical consciousness which
perceives the history of the individual self as representative of
larger social realities. From the
earliest slave narratives like Up
From Slavery to Alex Haley's Roots,
individual consciousnesses set out
to discover themselves as members
of their community, as participants in a history that they must
consciously remember in order to
recover.
There are other features
of the American consciousness
which find a hospitable expression
in the autobiography. The revolutionary Protestantism of those
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arnvmg on the Mayflower
endorsed individual self-assertion
in matters of politics and religion.
The individual self has thereafter
retained a sanctioned preeminence in all aspects of American
life. Indeed, I am told that there
is even a new, glossy magazine
entitled Self Whitman is our
great poet writing the uniquely
American epic of the self. Autobiography then would surely have a
special appeal as a literary genre
which would allow writers to create churches to themselves.
America is like no nation in history; Americans are not like anyone
in history. Each of us, so we
believe, is a unique individual with
a uniquely distinctive story worth
telling. The individual has value,
and, this is the great American
myth that seeds our dreams, the
individual can succeed.
Many of the American
autobiographies are stories of
success. Lest we think that only
the present is so obsessively selforiented, let me quote for you the
beginning of Benjamin Franklin's
Autobiography: "As a constant good
fortune has accompanied me to
even an advanced period of life,
my posterity will perhaps be
desirous of learning the means,
which I employed, and which,
thanks to Providence, so well succeeded with me." Franklin may
appear modest in invoking providence, but really what he is saying
is this: "Let me tell you, folks, how
I succeeded; you could learn from
me." In fact, he continues on to
say that his readers "may also
deem" the means he employed as
"fit to be imitated." Lee lacocca's
Iacocca is born from the same
impulse and perhaps his readers
turn to his autobiography hoping
to learn the secrets of his success.
Yet while much of what I
have said about American autobi-

ography may apply to the list I
have culled from The New York
Times Book Review, the autobiographies that now make the best
seller status are, I think, somewhat
different. Let me confess, for
instance, that except in my capacity as a chronicler of our times,
these are not books that pique my
interest. Northrop Frye writes in
his Anatomy of Criticism: "Nearly
always some theoretical and intellectual interest in religion,
politics, or art plays a leading role
in the confession. It is his success
in integrating his mind on such
subjects that makes the author of
a confession feel that his life is
worth writing about." I would
argue that it is our anticipation of
this kind of reflection in an autobiography that makes the book
worth reading.
Yet, such expectations
seem out of place for many of the
books that now occupy pride of
place on the best seller list. These
writers are not describing lives of
great magnitude or dealing with
issues of great consequence or
grappling with connections
between their soul and their world
or charting the development of a
self-consciously evolving mind.
Nor can I assume that I will be
in teres ted in the character of
these writers as I am Rousseau's or
Montaigne's or Charles Lamb's.
Autobiographies entice me
because they are fascinating recreations of a self whose authenticity
and validity I as a reader am called
upon to affirm, a process which I
expect will lead me to discoveries
of my self, my time, my place.
Such expectations,too, seem out
of place from books from the best
seller list.
What, then, are the expectations and delights that lead
multitudes of today's readers to
such books? What interests do
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they satisfy both of writers and
their readers and what do they tell
us of the culture within which
such an enterprise thrives so well?
All the writers are stars of some
kind or another. Sometimes, as
with a Jessica Hahn, the public
limelight may only be there
because of sexual misadventures
with someone else who is a
celebrity, but at the very least
these are people whose names
have been household words for a
moment in time. These are memoirs where what is remembered is
memorable largely by virtue of the
situation or social status of the
writers and not because of some
intrinsic worth of the objects of
memory or the mind that remembers. The exceptions are also
revealing. Gilda Radner's book
describes her fight with cancer,
her will to live, her courage under
stress that evoke a personality one
can admire. Yet we read her book
less because of the nature of her
story or character but more
because of who she was-the star of
the television and celluloid screen.
These always famous and
usually rich (if not before the
book then after the book) people
are the substitute elite of this
nation who serve us in lieu of a
genuine elite. We have abandoned inherited titles and
aristocracies of rank. But we still
seek distinction and distinction, so
it seems, in our minds is now
equated with celebrity status. In
some paradoxical way, our craving
to read about lives of distinction,
however this distinction is
defined, is a function of the
democratization of this culture.
On the one hand, only in a democratic culture can everyone
presume that what he or she has
to say deserves the time and attention of others. As William Dean
Howells said, autobiography is
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"the most democratic province in
the republic of letters." On the
other hand, it is also in a levelling
democracy that so many ordinary
lives would want to be touched by
the glamor of lives lived in a different ambit. It is surely telling
that even as we believe profoundly
in the equal worth of all lives, we
are nevertheless fascinated by
those who are, in some visible way,
a little better than equal. Equality
is a fine but abstract moral concept. In an extremely competitive
culture like ours, we expect-even
want-some people to come out at
the top of the heap, and those
who have made it to the top, whatever the heap and whatever the
reason, we find worthy of our
interest.
At its best, autobiography
humanizes the heroic and the
extraordinary. People whose lives
seem to be lived on a grander
scale than ours become accessible
and knowable because to read an
autobiography is to share a life, to
become a part of the life of the
writer. We project our own life
into the text, merging our own life
with that of someone else. Saint
Teresa of Avila records that when
she read Saint Augustine's Confessions she saw herself being
described there. It is this desire to
become part of the lives of the
rich and famous, to achieve the
voyeuristic pleasure of being
someplace we could not be otherwise, that draws us to their books.
George Burns' best friends can
become our best friends.
There is perhaps a less
healthy form of levelling also
going on here. Even as we enter
the world of these stars, they are
also, paradoxically, being brought
down to our level. What a pleasure it is to discover that the
motives and concerns and preoccupations of these high and

mighty people are really no different from our own. How we relish
the little sleazy exposures of self
and others that liven these books
for us. In fact, our delight at such
exposure is so palpable and strong
that it has helped spawn a whole
sub-genre of kiss and tell books
that have hit the best seller list this
past decade. So many of these
books are gossip on a grand scale
and gossip is a wonderfully levelling activity. And gossip is also
such an intimate activity, or at
least one that offers a false sense
of intimacy. Is it because our
world offers so little genuine intimacy that we crave this spurious
intimacy of gossip? Is it because
our world offers so few genuine
communities that we we are so
ready to become members of communities far away out there,
communities where the price of
membership is only the price of
the book?
Nancy Reagan has said
that she wrote My Turn for history
and for her children, and, of
course, to give "my side" of the story. But Random House, in having
paid her a reputed three million
dollars, knows better. The book is
not going to sell because of our
interest in history. We will read it
because we'll learn more about
the White House china, about
Don Regan, about Nancy's and
Ronnie's relationship with their
children, about Nancy's hostilities
towards Raisa Gorbachev, about
maybe even the truth of her age
(is she 67 or 65?). "What made
Nancy Reagan's book," says
Lawrence Hughes, chairman of
the Hearst Trade Group, "was Don
Regan's book" which disclosed
that the Reagans consulted
astrologers. Now we await the
book from the astrologer.D
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Reel Realism
Edward Byrne
The intelligentsia have always had
contempt for the realistic novel-a
form that wallows so enthusiastically
in the dirt of everyday life and the
dirty secrets of class envy and that,
still worse, is so easily understood and
obviously relished by the mob, i.e., the
middle class.

-Tom Wolfe
Good theater and good drama
should move and shock you. You have
to wake them up. Movies have gotten
too cerebral.

-Oliver Stone
In the November, 1989, issue of
Harper's Magazine Tom Wolfe

issued "a literary manifesto"
("Stalking the Billion-Footed
Beast: A Literary Manifesto for the
New Social Novel") deploring the
near abandonment of the realistic
novel by American authors since
the end of World War II. Wolfe
concludes that "if fiction writers
do not start facing the obvious,
the literary history of the second
half of the twentieth century will
record that journalists not only
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took over the richness of American life as their domain but also
seized the high ground of literature itself." Throughout the
article, Wolfe offers what he sees
as evidence of the erosion of the
power of the novel due to a turn
towards absurdism, abstraction,
and minimalism by many of America's contemporary authors.
To perceptive readers these
charges were not representative of
new revelations, merely an
enlargement of the collection of
previous pictures depicting the
literary situation in America presented by Wolfe, as well as others,
ever since his publication of The
New Journalism in 1973. Still,
Wolfe's manifesto has stirred a
great deal of response, especially
among American writers: some
strongly in support of his stance,
others irate at his attack on the
current state of fiction, many animated in defense of themselves
and articulate in defense of their
fellow novelists. Already, writers as
diverse as Margaret Atwood, Philip
Roth, Walker Percy, Alison Lurie,
Madison Smartt Bell, Mary Gordon, Scott Spencer, Jim Harrison,
T. Coraghessan Boyle, and John
Hawkes have answered invitations
to join the fracas.
Clearly, it is not difficult to
counter Wolfe's blanket assertion
that American novelists in the last
half of the century have almost

unanimously and uniformly fled
from realist fiction: too many
examples to the contrary exist.
Nevertheless, it appears impossible to deny an implication which
arises from Wolfe's major contentions: the novel's power to
move individuals is no longer
supreme among the narrative arts.
As Wolfe states it, the novel has
been displaced "as American literature's 'main event.'" Whether
one agrees with his observation
that "in at least four years out of
five the best nonfiction books
have been better literature than
the most highly praised books of
fiction" over the past twenty-five
years, one must acknowledge that
the impact of the novel on American attitudes, morals, values,
customs, and politics has diminished, if not disappeared, since
the works of Hemingway, Fitzgerald, Faulkner, Lewis, Steinbeck,
and others in the years between
the World Wars. Society no longer
looks towards its authors' works of
fiction or, for that matter, non-fiction for instant self-reflection and
long-term guidance, except sometimes in an indirect manner as
these works are adapted for, and
adopted by, the silver screen. Film
is the fictional, and at times nonfictional, narrative which best
serves these purposes now.
For most Americans, the mirror reflecting today's society and
27

the looking-glass offering the
direction to be taken in tomorrow's world are clearly shown by
those rectangular screens illuminating the movie theatres and
living rooms of America. Characters in today's novels do not
inspire changes in fashion as Lady
Brett Ashley managed to do for
many women in the late 1900s or
define romantic relationships for
all the way Jay Gatsby and Daisy
Buchanan once did; instead, fashion follows the lead of film
characters like Annie Hall, and
the relationships between men
and women are influenced by the
way Harry treats Sally.
More importantly, our views of
larger issues such as war or race
relations are no longer presented
through novels dominating
national attention like those of
Hemingway, or even Norman
Mailer, and Ralph Ellison did at
one time, but through films which
create a nationwide stir of interest
like those by directors such as
Michael Cimino and Spike Lee.
This shift in influence from the
novel to the cinema has occurred
gradually since the end of World
War II along with the migration of
film crews off studio lots for onlocation shooting, but has
escalated in the last three decades
since the institution of the ratings
system on Hollywood films ironically allowed, and in most cases
encouraged (in order to gain the
more desirable R rating), moviemakers to be more bold in their
depictions of the darker, dingier,
and more dangerous sides of
American society. Responding to
the political and social turmoil of
the times, American filmmakers
sometimes reflected the sordid
and cynical sides of of the nation's
public figures or institutions, and
spotlighted the events which at
other times triggered, if not a revolution, at least a cultural
evolution in the last thirty years.
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At the same time, technological
developments, such as the
steadicam, allowed for the more
intimate filmmaking appropriate
for investigating the apparent contradictions and conflicts between
the self and society in contemporary America. As a result, since
the late sixties America's most
powerful fllms have contained just
those qualities Wolfe called for in
his first manifesto of 1973, "a highly detailed realism ... a realism
more thorough than any currently
being attempted, a realism that
would portray the individual in
intimate and inextricable relation
to the society around him." In
fact, American directors have
been able to recreate the realism
of contemporary society so well
that they have virtually eliminated
any possibility of novelists competing in the arena of realism for the
minds and hearts of the American
masses.
Mistakenly, Wolfe has concluded that those serious American
authors who have abandoned the
realistic novel have done so voluntarily and without coercion. On
the contrary, many American novelists have determined that they
almost have no choice: when one
cannot compete in the arena of
realism because the medium of
film is so much more immediate
and its verisimilitude so much
more convincing, one must turn
to a style which is served well by
words rather than pictures and
which cannot as easily be recreated by film-abstraction. Even
some of those authors who have
bravely adhered to realism in contemporary literature (Raymond
Carver, Bobbie Ann Mason, Ann
Beattie, etc.) find themselves
attacked by critics, including
Wolfe, as "K-Mart Realists"
because their descriptive writing
styles have borrowed the images
and icons of commercialized
America normally associated with

the visuals of film or television,
because their minimalist constructions resemble film-scripts, and
because their plots have tended to
train their attention upon individual introspection, leaving lots of
room for filmmakers to fill in their
own visions of the surrounding
society as they adapt these works
for the vast scale of the motionpicture screen.
Of course, this is not the first
time an art form has lost its position atop the cultural ladder. In
the late-nineteenth century the
novel, with its power and potential
to offer more realistic narrative
than the poem, captured more
completely the attention of the
reading public. Especially after
the horrors of World War I, American audiences found the more
realistic tales of their times as
related in the novels of Hemingway and Fitzgerald far more
compelling than the poetry of the
era which had already abandoned
realism to the novelists and turned
toward the abstraction exemplified by modernists such as Eliot,
Pound, and Stevens. In the visual
arts, painters discovered as the
twentieth century began that they
could not compete with the
verisimilitude of the photograph
and-like their counterparts in
poetry-moved away from realism
through various stages from
Cubism to Abstract Expressionism.
Theatre's position at the beginning of the century as the prime
narrative offering spectacle suddenly was supplanted by the
cinema, and so modern theatre
moved more towards minimalism
and abstraction. Even in the case
of filmmaking, a strong argument
would demonstrate, at least partially, that the relatively recent
revival of emphasis upon realism
in cinema by some of the country's best directors has been an
attempt to compete with the current events witnessed daily on
The Cresset

cable news programming or nightly on the television networks'
newscasts.
The American director whose
name emerges as often as anyone
else's in current discussions of
film realism is Oliver Stone. In
the short span of five years, Stone
has released a series of potent portraits of American social, cultural,
and political upheaval which, as
prescribed by Wolfe, have introduced an "individual in intimate
and inextricable relation to the
society around him," or which
have presented "a slice of life, a
cross section, that provided a true
and powerful picture of individuals and society." The films which
Stone has directed include the following: Salvador ( 1986), Platoon
(1986), Wall Street (1987), Talk
Radio (1988), and Born on the
Fourth of]uly (1989).
Oliver Stone first received
widespread recognition as a
screenwriter when his screenplay
for Midnight Express (1978) won an
Academy Award. The uncompromising toughness of that script
seemed to offer a promise for
future screenwriting assignments.
However, after a number of years
of writing scripts fashioned for
others' visions in films like Scarface
(1983), Year of the Dragon (1985),
and 8 Million Ways to Die (1986),
Stone decided the only way to get
his personal statements on the
screen would be to write and
direct the films himself.
Since the late 1970s, Stone had
been carrying two scripts about
the Vietnam War, Platoon and Born
on the Fourth ofJuly, from studio to
studio and having doors closed in
his face. Eventually, in 1985, one
smaller film company, Hemdale,
agreed to back Platoon; however, at
the time, they would not pick up
the second Vietnam script. One
must remember that, although
more than a decade had passed
since the end of the war, by 1985
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only three films about Vietnam
had received any real critical
recognition, Coming Home (1978),
The Deer Hunter (1978), and Apocalypse Now (1979), none qualifying
as a blockbuster at the box office.
Hemdale was gambling on Platoon;
it couldn't afford to take any
greater chance by committing to
two Vietnam epics. Also, Hemdale
knew when it signed Stone that it
was getting a director whose devotion to realism and belief in frank
expression would counter all the
unwritten rules which guided studio executives in their decisions
about which scripts could turn
into hit films.
Stone's attitudes toward filmmaking were formed in the
seventies while he was a student in
the film program at New York University, which seems to inspire a
much greater respect and affection for realism in its graduates
(including, most prominently,
Stone, Martin Scorsese, and Spike
Lee) than that created by its more
famous California cousins, the
film programs at USC and UCLA.
Stone studied under NYU alumnus Scorsese, and ·worked with
Scorsese on a number of projects,
including the production of a
1970 student/faculty collaborative
film, entitled Street Scenes, which
chronicled college campus conflicts concerning race relations
and anti-war activities, and followed political demonstrations
from Wall Street to Washington.
Like Scorsese, Stone saw filmmaking as a way of confronting viewers
with those aspects of society which
in ordinary living they perhaps
had gone out of their way to avoid.
Both Scorsese and Stone present a
personal vision of society which
appears to have been seen
through a microscope: not only
are the small flaws on the skin of
society, which when viewed from
afar disappear in to the background, suddenly visible, but the

germs beneath the surface of the
body politic-the causes of social
disease as well as the keys to any
future cures-are offered, and in
the case of historical films such as
Platoon and Born on the Fourth of
july even exhumed, for examination.
Born on the Fourth of July is
Stone's most ambitious project
and, therefore, is subject to some
minor errors in judgment as his
dialogue seems overly sentimental
or stilted in a few scenes, yet it is
the film which fulfills his promise
as an important filmmaker willing
to continue to assume the role as
one of Hollywood's main risk-takers. In fact, one might be tempted
to say that Purple-Heart Vietnam
veterans Stone and Ron Kovic,
upon whose experiences the
movie focuses, earned the right to
express a few sen tim en tal
moments just as they earned their
stripes and combat badges; they
might be considered part of the
privileges which come after difficult battle. Although all of Stone's
previous movies have achieved varied degrees of critical acclaim, and
every one of them has challenged
its audience to review the relationship between self and society, each
had been limited by the controlled scope of an independent
view of an individual experience.
Salvador served up a journalist's
solitary slant on American intervention in Central America.
Platoon, masterpiece that it may
be, offered, in Stone's own opinion, "a white boy's view of the
war." Wall Street presented a young
man's discovery about how a
desire for the power of position
and possession can easily cause
corruption. And Talk Radio concentrated on the claustrophobic
atmosphere in a radio studio as a
confrontational late-night host of
a conversation show discusses the
controversial concerns of his city's
citizens.
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Paradoxically, despite Tom
Cruise's confinement to bed, body
cast, or wheelchair throughout
most of the film in his role as Ron
Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July
moves beyond the barriers
imposed by an individual experience and widens the horizon far
enough to encompass at least six
separate stories: the adolescent
romanticism of wartime activities,
the harsh reality of war's horrors,
the inadequate rehabilitation of
the wounded, the awkward reintroduction of the veteran to the
old world of family or friends, the
painful rejection of the warrior by
certain sectors of the society for
which he felt he'd fought, and the
ultimate refusal by some brave soldiers to withdraw from the battle
on the homefront so that the
truth about the war would be
heard by all.
Ironically, in order for those
truths to finally be heard by all,
Ron Kovic's book, like other fiction and non-fiction books today,
had to be translated to the more
immediate, more powerful medium of film. In a recent issue of
The New York Times Book Review,
Molly Haskell, in a front-page article ("Is It Time to Trust
Hollywood?") observing the
changing relationship between
film and the novel, Hollywood and

the novelist, reports producer
Peter Guber as saying, "If only the
people who read the book go to
the movie, the movie is a disaster:
200,000 read The Witches of Eastwick, two million may read a best
seller-still a drop in the bucket
in movie audience terms."
Haskell, herself, states that,
despite her reservations about the
relationship between film and the
novel, about Hollywood's infatuation with "star magic," she has to
admit that "Tom Cruise gives a
stunning performance, and without a star, a charismatic presence,
what audience would want to follow a Vietnam veteran into the
quagmire of loss and desperation
and physical ruin that paraplegia
represents?" Although she misses
the point that what moves the
audience is more the power of the
medium shaped by the hands of
an adept director than the star, (as
Stone's earlier works without boxoffice stars seem to confirm),
Haskell does concede with apparent reluctance the power and
popularity of the form. To borrow
from the language of Tom Wolfe,
one might say it appears that still
today many of the intelligentsia
have contempt for the realist cinema-"a form that wallows so
enthusiastically in the dirt of
everyday life and the dirty secrets

of class envy and that, still worse, is
so easily understood and obviously
relished by the mob, i.e., the middle class." However, it has become
clear that film has overtaken the
novel as the instrumental, and
influential, form for literature
today.
In his manifesto, Tom Wolfe, in
apparent despair over the loss of
the power of the novel in contemporary times, declares that
"America today, in a headlong
rush of her own, may or may not
truly need a literature worthy of
her vastness." Born on the Fourth of
july was released in the end of
December, making it eligible for
the Academy Award it so rightfully
deserves (no other American
movie of the last year even compares to this one), but went into
nationwide release in January.
However, whether one regards it
as the last great film of the eighties or the first fine film of the
nineties seems to matter little. In
any case, Oliver Stone's Born on the
Fourth of July stands out as an
excellent example of how directors of realist cinema are
supplying for con temporary
America "a literature worthy of
her vastness" and are delivering to
all of American society, whether or
not we are willing to admit it, the
influential literature of our future.
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